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ANONYMITY IN CYBERSPACE: WHAT CAN
WE LEARN FROM JOHN DOE?
LYRiSSA BARNETT LIDSKY*
Abstract: This Article examines the evolution of the law governing libel
suits against anonymous 'John Doe" defendants based on Internet speech.
Between 1999 and 2009, courts crafted new First Amendment doctrines
to protect Internet speakers from having their anonymity automatically
stripped away upon the filing of a libel action. Courts also adapted exist-
ing First Amendment protections for hyperbole, satire, and other non-
factual speech to protect the distinctive discourse of Internet message
boards. Despite these positive developments, the current state of the law
is unsatisfactory. Because the scope of protection for anonymous Internet
speech varies greatly by jurisdiction, resourceful plaintiffs can make stra-
tegic use of libel law to silence their critics. Meanwhile, plaintiffs who are
truly harmed by cybersmears will find little effective recourse in libel law.
Though disheartening, the current state of the law may be a testament to
the difficulty of balancing speech and reputation in the Internet age.
INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, libel suits against anonymous 'John Doe" defendants
based on Internet postings were rare.' Only a few Doe cases2 had made
* © 2009, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Stephen C. O'Connell Chair, University of Florida
Levin College of Law. Thanks to Daniel Friedel for his invaluable research assistance.
I See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49
DuKE L.J. 855, 858 n.6 (2000) (listing libel cases as of 2000). Federal law largely bars libel
suits against Internet service providers and website operators based on defamatory content
posted by third parties. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). Courts have interpreted broadly the
scope of immunity provided by § 230. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330-35 (4th Cir. 1997). But see Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157,
1174-75 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding website operator responsible for content posted by third
parties where it "directly participate [d] in developing the alleged illegality").
2 1 refer here only to the Doe cases involving libel and related tort claims, and not to
the separate line of Doe cases involving copyright infringement via file-sharing. The copy-
right infringement cases against Doe defendants involve a different, and arguably more
limited, speech interest than the libel cases. See Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F.
Supp. 2d 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (discussing the limited First Amendment interests in-
volved in downloading files). For that reason, courts have balanced the relevant First
Amendment interests differently in copyright infringement cases than in libel cases involv-
ing Doe defendants. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-16, No. 1:08-CV-765, 2009 WL
414060, at *3 (N.D.N.Y Feb. 18, 2009) ("Because of the modest First Amendment right to
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their way into reported decisions3 and few judges seemed sensitive to
the First Amendment issues involved.4 Today, much has changed in both
the nature of the Doe suits and courts' handling of them. This Article
examines the evolution of this area of law and attempts to extract prin-
ciples and insights relevant to emerging Internet speech disputes.
I. IN THE BEGINNING
Initially, the Doe cases tended to present as Goliath versus David
scenarios. The typical Goliaths were companies or their leaders suing
for libel after one or many 'John Does" criticized them online, usually
on a financial message board. After filing suit, the corporate Goliaths
sought to obtain the identities of the Doe defendants by subpoenaing
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). From there, it was usually a shor t step
to unmasking the John Does. Many ISPs turned over the identifying
information without even notifying the Does that it was being sought.5
Even with notice, few Does had the resources to find counsel and file
motions to quash. Those few Does who did file motions were often met
with judicial hostility.6 Many judges had little understanding of the cul-
ture of Internet message boards and simply ordered disclosure with no
concern for the unique First Amendment interests involved.
These early Doe suits threatened First Amendment values and
highlighted deficits in the U.S. Supreme Court's libel and anonymous
speech jurisprudence. One major concern was the potential chilling
effect of these lawsuits. Although any libel action is likely to have a chill-
ing effect, the sudden proliferation of actions against defendants of
modest means merely for speaking their minds threatened to subvert
the Internet's promise of a more fully participatory public discourse. 7.
remain anonymous when there is an allegation of copyright infringement, the Court must
balance the tension between this minimally protected constitutional right and a copyright
owner's right to disclosure of the identity of a possible trespasser of its intellectual property
interest.").
3 See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 858 n.6.
4 See e.g., id. Lee Tien was one of the first scholars to recognize the unique challenges
of anonymous Internet speech cases. See generally Lee Tien, Whos Afraid of Anonymous
Speech?McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117 (1996).
5 Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 n.5 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (dis-
cussing the problem of lack of notice).
6 See, e.g., Hvide v. John Does 1 through 8, No. 99-22831 CA 01, court order at 52-54
(Fla. Cir. Ct. May 25, 2000) (on file with author, who was acting as counsel for one of the
Does at a hearing in which the judge compared anonymous Internet speakers to hooded
Ku Klux Klan members and admitted that she did not use the Internet extensively).
7 For an extended version of this argument, see Lidsky; supra note 1, at 888-98.
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The revolutionary promise of the Internet as a medium of mass
communication is to open the "marketplace of ideas" to all citizens. 8
The "old" mass media-newspapers, magazines, books, and broadcast-
ers-placed a gatekeeper between the speaker and her audience. 9 The
Internet removed that gatekeeper, allowing more speakers than ever
before to reach a mass audience. 10 The resulting "democratization" of
discourse made it harder for those in power to control the interpreta-
tion of public events and exposed them to criticism from new quar-
ters.1 And that in turn spurred the John Doe suits. 12
Some newly empowered speakers were responsible critics publish-
ing uncomfortable truths and constitutionally protected opinions, but
others were not.13 Both types of speakers, however, became targets of
libel actions aimed at suppressing criticism and reestablishing existing
hierarchies. 14 These often well-publicized actions signaled not only to
named defendants, but to prospective critics as well, that they could be
easily unmasked and subjected to costly litigation where the outcome
hinged on the vagaries of a libel law not yet adapted to the cultures of
Internet speech. Although the extent of the chilling effect was inher-
s See id. at 894-95 ("The Internet gives citizens inexpensive access to a medium of mass
communication and therefore transforms every citizen into a potential 'publisher' of in-
formation for First Amendment purposes.").
9 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for
the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (2004) ("Mass media create a technological
bottleneck, and the people who control mass media are gatekeepers controlling its use.").
10 As one scholar has noted, the characteristics of Internet speech include immediate
publication without the intervention of intermediaries or editors to an international audi-
ence. Yival Karniel, Defamation on the Internet-A New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace, 2 J.
INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 215, 220 (2009). The resulting speech, which may be anonymous, is
potentially accessible, both freely and for free, to a mass audience. Id.
1 SeeDoe No. I v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005). It is easy to overhype the revo-
lutionary potential of the Internet. Citizens still need substantial resources to use the In-
ternet to reach a mass audience, and even in the online environment, the traditional mass
media still "provide a focal point for audience attention." Balkin, supra note 9, at 10; accord
MATrrnEw HINDMAN, TiIE MYTH OF DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2008).
12 Or at least, it spurred John Doe suits after § 230 of the Communications Decency
Act ("CDA") foreclosed access to the most readily identifiable deep pocket defendant. See
supra note 1.
13 See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 1, at 866-68 (discussing the complaint in HealthSouth
Corp. v. Krum).
14 See Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (noting, in
the trade secret context, that "[tlechnology blurs the traditional identities of David and
Goliath"). See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Proposing a Mechanism for Removing Trade Secrets
from the Internet, 12 No. 3 J. INTERNET L. 3 (2008) (providing further discussion of the
problems caused by Internet disclosures of trade secrets); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret
Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1425 (2009)
(same).
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ently unquantifiable, the Doe suits quickly became a serious concern
for First Amendment advocates.
In addition to the inherently nebulous threat of chilling Internet
speech, the Doe suits also threatened a specific First Amendment
right-the right to speak anonymously. The technology and culture of
the Internet multiplied exponentially the number of anonymous speak-
ers contributing to public discourse. The right to speak anonymously,
however, is not an absolute right. Speakers have no right to use ano-
nymity as a shield against liability for defamation. 15 The difficulty for
courts is that it is not always easy to discern whether a statement is de-
famatory. Calling a company a "scam" might be defamatory or it might
be mere hyperbole; it all comes down to context. Thus, resourceful
plaintiffs can file (or threaten to file) for libel almost any time they en-
counter harsh criticism online. If a mere allegation of libel, without
more, is enough to force the unmasking of the alleged defamer, the
First Amendment right to speak anonymously is largely meaningless. As
of 1999, however, First Amendment jurisprudence provided defendants
little protection from having their anonymity stripped away by the filing
of a libel action.1 6
HI. THE NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The legal landscape has altered considerably in the intervening
decade. Faced with a growing number of anonymous speech cases,
many courts have not only developed new legal doctrines to address the
issues raised by the Doe cases, but have also made existing doctrines
responsive to the culture of Internet discourse.
A. Development of New Legal Doctfines
Although the law governing anonymous speech is still developing,
courts are beginning to converge on a set of standards to balance the
right to speak anonymously with the rights of those injured by defama-
tory anonymous speech. 17 Put simply, these standards, or balancing
15 Or any other tort or crime.
16 See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 858 n.6.
17 For an illustrative sample of Doe cases and unmasking standards, arranged chrono-
logically, see Best W Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at *4-
*5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006); Highfields Capital Mgmt. L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969, 975-
76 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash.
2001); In re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 WL 34806203, at *12 (W.D. La. Dec. 20, 2001);
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 231, 244-46 (Ct. App. 2008); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460-61 (Del.
[Vol. 50:1373
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tests, are designed to sort legitimate defamation actions from "cyber-
slapps"-unfounded suits designed only to chill speech-at an early
stage of the discovery process. Courts have crafted slightly different
verbal formulae and added a varying number of factors to their tests,
but most tests boil down to two main components.
The first component provides John Doe notice of the lawsuit and
an opportunity to file a motion to quash to protect his anonymity1 8
Obviously, the notice requirement cannot be applied too stringently
when the defendant's identity is unknown. Thus, courts have held that
plaintiffs can satisfy this component by posting notice of the suit in the
forum where Doe allegedly posted his defamatory statement.1 9 Once
notice is given, 20 the Doe has a short window of opportunity to assert
his First Amendment rights.2 1
The second component of the balancing test requires plaintiffs to
provide some indicia that their suits are viable libel actions before the
2005); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 (Md. 2009); Dendrite Int'l,
Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Subpoena
Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (In reAOL), 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) rev'd on
other grounds sub nom, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377
(Va. 2001). I have previously offered my recommendations for what type of standards
should govern disclosure of the Doe defendants' identity. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas
F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1598-
1602 (2007).
18 See, e.g., Cahil4 884 A.2d at 460-61; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457.
19 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460-61 ("[When a case arises in the internet context, the plain-
tiff must post a message notifying the anonymous defendant of the plaintiffs discovery
request on the same message board where the allegedly defamatory statement was origi-
nally posted."). But see Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244 (noting that even this is not a fixed
requirement when the original Internet forum is no longer available or when the defen-
dant clearly has received notice by other means, such as via his Internet service provider or
the message board sponsor).
20 Many ISPs now give their subscribers notice that their identity is being sought via
subpoena. It would be even better if they were required to do so by statute. For example,
federal law already prohibits operators of cable systems from disseminating subscriber data
without consent, except in certain circumstances including when disclosure is necessary to
render service and when disclosure is made to the government pursuant to a court order,
in which case the subscriber must receive notice. See 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2006); see also
Fitch v. Doe #1, 869 A.2d 722, 728-29 (Me. 2005) (holding that a cable system operator
ISP could release subscriber information to a nongovernmental entity if the disclosure was
made subject to a court order and the subscriber was notified).
21 See Roger M. Rosen & Charles B. Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for Interne
Defamation, L.A. LAW, Oct. 2001, at 19 ("Most ISPs now give their account holders two or
more weeks' notice of a subpoena before divulging any information in response to it."); see
also Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118
YALE L.J. 320, 349 (2008) (discussing advantages of a flexible rather than fixed time for
response).
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court will order disclosure of defendants' identities.2 2 Courts have
framed this component in various ways, ranging from requiring: (1) a
"good faith basis" for plaintiffs claim; 23 (2) pleadings sufficient to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss; 24 (3) a showing of evidence sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case of defamation coupled with a balancing of the
right to speak anonymously and the right to pursue a libel claim; 25 and
(4) a showing of evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment, with-
out the additional balancing test.26 Of these, the third standard-the
prima facie case plus balancing standard-appears to be gaining ground
as the dominant standard.27
Indeed, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted this standard in
2009 in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie 28 Specifically, the court
22 See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 449-56 (reviewing the different "viability" standards employed
by state and federal courts in John Doe cases). In the Doe cases decided thus far, courts
appear to have assumed that the speech involved receives full First Amendment protection
unless it is libelous. Courts have not addressed whether the balance between the interests
of plaintiff and defendant should be struck differently if plaintiff is a private figure and the
speech is of only private concern. It also remains to be seen how courts will decide cases
involving allegedly defamatory commercial speech.
23 See 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095; it reAOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37.
24 See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(involving trademark infringement claim against a John Doe rather than libel); Lassa v.
Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006) ("When faced with an assertion of constitu-
tional privilege against disclosure of information identifying otherwise-anonymous organi-
zation members, the circuit court should decide a pending motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim before sanctioning the party for refusing to disclose that information.").
25 This standard borrowed from Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61
(NJ. Super. A.D. 2001), was recently adopted by Maryland's highest court in Independent
Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie. 966 A.2d at 457; see also Greenbaum x Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d
695, 698-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (applying qualified Dendrite standard).
26 Cahil 884 A.2d at 460-61. Cahill held that a plaintiff must support his claim with
facts sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 460; see also McMann v.
Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266-68 (D. Mass. 2006) (applying Cahill standard); In reDoes 1-
10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 821-23 (Tex. App. 2007) (same). This list oversimplifies the situation
somewhat, as some courts have adopted their own variations on one of these standards. See,
e.g., Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720-21 (adopting hybrid of Cahill and Dendrite standards). One
court has held that its existing procedural rules, which allow defendants to move for pro-
tective order against discovery "sought in bad faith" or that "would cause unreasonable
annoyance, embarrassment, [or] oppression" were sufficient to protect Doe defendants'
First Amendment interests. Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v.JPA Dev., Inc.,
No. 0425 Mar. Term 2004, 2006 WL 37020, at *9 (Pa. Com. P1. Jan. 4, 2006). The great
variety in legal standards suggests the need for a uniform rule to govern John Doe cases.
27 For examples of courts applying Dendrite-based standards, see supra note 25. For ex-
amples of courts applying Cahi-based standards, see supra note 26.
28 966 A.2d at 457. In Brodie, the plaintiff sued a newspaper and three "John Does" for
statements they posted on the newspaper's website. Id. at 442. The plaintiff, a businessman,
sued for defamation and "conspiracy to defame" and subpoenaed the newspaper to reveal
the identities of "John Does" associated with five screen names on its website. Id. The trial
1378 [Vol. 50:1373
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held that in a defamation action involving anonymous speakers, a trial
court should not order disclosure until five criteria are satisfied. 29 The
first two criteria ensure that defendants have notice and an opportunity
to defend.30 The third requires the plaintiff to identify with specificity
the allegedly defamatory statements made by defendants. 31 The fourth
requires the trial court to "determine whether the complaint has set
forth a prima facie defamation per se or per quod action against the
anonymous posters."32 Finally, "if all else is satisfied, [the trial court
must] balance the anonymous poster's First Amendment right of free
speech against the strength of the pfima facie case of defamation pre-
sented by the plaintiff and the necessity for disclosure of the anony-
mous defendant's identity, prior to ordering disclosure."33 A few com-
ments are in order regarding the third and fourth criteria.
First, the prima facie evidence standard offers Doe defendants lit-
tle protection if it can be satisfied with "mere allegations of fact."3 4
Thus, in applying the standard, courts have required the plaintiff to
produce "sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of
action, on a prima facie basis."35 Second, a plaintiff can only be ex-
pected to provide prima facie evidence regarding those elements of the
claim within the plaintiff's control.36 Plaintiffs ordinarily will have ac-
court promptly dismissed the newspaper from the case because it was immune from suit
under the Communications Decency Act. Id. at 445. The trial court, however, denied the
newspaper's motion for a protective order and required disclosure of the identities associ-
ated with five screen names. Id. at 447. Notably, plaintiff sued only three of these defen-
dants: "CorsicaRiver," "Born & amp; Raised Here," and "chatdusoleil." Id. at 448. Plaintiff
did not include "RockyRaccoonMD" and "Suze" in the suit, but alleged that they had made
defamatory statements. Id. at 448-49. The trial court nonetheless ordered disclosure re-
garding all five screen names. Id. at 447. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the plaintiff "had not pleaded a valid defamation claim against any of them." Id. As a
matter of defamation law, this holding is unexceptional. The three named defendants-
"CorsicaRiver," "Born & amp; Raised Here," and "chatdusoleil"--had posted statements
about someone other than plaintiff, and plaintiff's potential claims against two others-
"RockyRaccoonMD" and "Suze"-were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 448-49.
29 Id. at 457.
3 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
3 See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (Adkins,J., concurring).
31 Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
36 Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245 ("A plaintiff need produce evidence of only those
material facts that are accessible to her."); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 (requiring, under
a summary judgment standard, the plaintiff to "introduce evidence creating a genuine
issue of material fact for all elements of a defamation claim within the plaintiff's control")
(emphasis added).
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cess to evidence regarding most elements of a defamation action at the
outset of litigation. For example, a public figure defamation plaintiff
must ordinarily plead and prove that the defendant published a false
and defamatory communication concerning plaintiff with "actual mal-
ice"-i.e., with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity.37 If plain-
tiff's claim is valid, he or she should have "easy access to proof"' of all of
these elements except actual malice.38 Moreover, it is not unfair to ex-
pect the plaintiff to produce this evidence. The plaintiff will ultimately
bear this burden anyway, and the new standard merely requires produc-
tion of prima facie evidence prior to disclosure of defendant's identity.
An additional comment is in order regarding the balancing test
applied in addition to the prima facie evidence standard. Arguably, a
separate balancing test is unnecessary because a balancing of interests
is built into the prima facie evidence standard.39 Under the prima facie
evidence standard, the defendant's right to speak anonymously out-
weighs the plaintiffs right to pursue a libel action unless and until the
plaintiff presents evidence that the libel claim is viable; once this bur-
den is met, the balance tips in favor of allowing plaintiff to pursue a
claim for vindication of her reputation. An explicit balancing test serves
only to tilt the scales further toward the protection of anonymous
speech because presumably it allows even a viable defamation claim to
be dismissed on the ground that it is not strong enough to outweigh
defendant's First Amendment interests.40
Although courts may be converging on standards for curbing the
use of libel suits to breach the right to speak anonymously, the piece-
meal, state-by-state development of standards continues to make the
scope of protection for John Does uncertain. Regardless of how high
courts set the bar for plaintiffs for obtaining aJohn Doe's identity, these
37 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that public
officials suing for defamation must prove actual malice); see also Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (extending New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to encompass public
figures). For further explanation, see LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY & R. GEORGE WRIGHT,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 67-70
(2004).
38 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464.
39 See, e.g., id. at 461 (asserting that balance is built into its summary judgment stan-
dard); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 458 (Adkins, J., concurring) (criticizing separate balancing test
as "unnecessary and needlessly complicated").
40 One potential advantage of a separate balancing test is that it would allow the court
to consider, in camera, a defendant's actual motive for speaking anonymously before order-
ing disclosure. For example, if defendant could show that she spoke anonymously because
she feared physical retaliation, a court might be more inclined to dismiss a viable defama-
tion claim.
[Vol. 50:1373
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new standards will provide insufficient protection to anonymous online
speech unless judges apply existing libel doctrines in ways that are re-
sponsive to the distinctive culture of Internet discourse. Luckily, there
are signs that courts are doing just that.4 1
B. Nuanced Application of Existing Docttine
Judges today are much more likely to have actually visited or used
a chat room, message board, blog, or social network than they were a
decade ago, and their familiarity with Internet discourse makes for bet-
ter legal decisions in John Doe cases. A good illustration of how judicial
understanding of Internet culture can affect outcomes in libel cases
may be seen in the 2008 case, Kiinsky v. Doe 6, decided by the California
Court of Appeal. 42
In Krinsky, the president of a corporation sued ten Doe defendants
in Florida for libel and intentional interference with contractual rela-
tions. 43 Plaintiff then subpoenaed Yahoo! in California to turn over the
identities attached to the Does' screen names.44 Yahoo! notified the
Does, one of whom, Doe 6, moved to quash on the grounds that disclo-
sure of his identity would violate his First Amendment right to speak
anonymously.45 The trial court denied the motion to quash, but the
California appellate court reversed, applying a "prima facie" showing
standard similar to that used in Brodie,46 though without a separate bal-
ancing test.47
41 For many Does, of course, this opportunity is meaningless because they cannot ob-
tain legal counsel. The development of standards to protect the rights of Doe defendants is
directly traceable to the work of public interest litigation groups such as the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Public Citizen, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center. As noted above, most of the early John Doe actions
were brought against defendants of modest means. Then as now many such defendants
simply could not afford legal counsel to protect their First Amendment rights. For a hand-
ful, however, these public interest organizations provided critical assistance and pursued a
litigation strategy that prodded judges to develop standards protecting the vitality of Inter-
net speech and the rights of anonymous speakers. While many John Does still have diffi-
culty finding counsel to protect their First Amendment rights, those that can find counsel
at least have favorable precedent to employ thanks in large part to these organizations.
42 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 234.
43 Id. at 234-35. To be precise, the plaintiff sued only nine of the ten for libel. Id. at
235.
44 Id. at 235.
4 Id.
46 See id. at 244-46. The court tried to avoid being doctrinaire about the "procedural
label" attached to "the showing required of a plaintiff seeking the identity of an anony-
mous speaker on the Internet" because different states "have different standards govern-
ing pleadings and motions." Id. at 244. Thus, the court evaluated Krinsky's showing under
20091 1381
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The Krinsky court's understanding of Internet message boards was
crucial to its determination of the key issue in the case: whether plain-
tiff had made a prima facie showing that Doe 6's statements were de-
famatory under Florida law. 48 There is no doubt that Doe 6's statements
were vulgar and offensive. He called the plaintiff and other corporate
officers "boobs, losers and crooks" 49 and set up a pretend monologue
by the corporation's Vice President of Legal Affairs in which he con-
templated performing oral sex on the plaintiff "even though she has fat
thighs, a fake medical degree, 'queefs' and has poor feminine hy-
giene."50 And plaintiffs claim that the statements were defamatory had
more than an initial ring of plausibility. In Florida, a defamatory com-
munication is one which "tends to harm the reputation of another as to
lower him or her in estimation of community or deter third persons
from associating or dealing with the defamed party."51 Certainly accus-
ing someone of criminal behavior and falsification of her medical de-
gree would normally be defamatory if published in an article in a
newspaper, and yet the court in Krinsky held that Doe 6's statements
were not defamatory.5 2
The explanation for this curious result lies in the dichotomy be-
tween fact and opinion. A statement can only be defamatory if it asserts
or implies objective facts about the plaintiff; otherwise, it will be
deemed constitutionally protected opinion. The Kfinsky court deter-
mined that Doe 6's assertions were opinion rather than fact based on a
deeply contextual analysis of his speech.5 3 The court clearly was influ-
enced by the fact that Doe 6 spoke anonymously on a financial message
board.54 At the outset, the court noted that the prevalence of anony-
mous speech on the Internet contributes to a "relaxed communication
style." 55 The court concluded that the informality of Internet message
boards makes speech there more like "gossip" than "accurate report-
a prima facie evidence standard, which was considered appropriate in light of Florida be-
ing a notice-pleading jurisdiction. See id. at 244-46; see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110.
47 Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244-46.
48 See id. at 246-50.
49 Id. at 235.
50 Id. at 235.
51 Id. at 246-47 (quoting Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So.2d 774, 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)).
5
-Id. at 250.
53 See 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 246-50.
54 See id. at 248-50. The court defined a financial message board as a forum "which of-
fers posters the opportunity to communicate with others concerning stock trading, corpo-
rate behavior, and other finance-related issues." Id. at 234.
55 Id. at 237-38.
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ing," noting "[h]yperbole and exaggeration are common, and 'venting'
is at least as common as careful and considered argumentation."5 6
The Krinsky court clearly understood that anonymity is a double-
edged sword. Anonymity frees speakers from inhibitions both good and
bad. Anonymity makes public discussion more uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open than ever before, but it also opens the door to more trivial,
abusive, libelous, and fraudulent speech.57 But the court also under-
stood that vituperative anonymous speech on financial message boards
often carries its own corrective, for it makes it less likely that reasonable
readers will take it seriously.58
In fact, the court found it incumbent to use care in categorizing
Doe 6's speech as defamatory precisely because debate in "Internet
chat rooms or message boards" is so often "heated and caustic."5 9 Doe 6
did not originate the controversy about plaintiff Krinsky's management
of her corporation. Instead, he, along with many other message board
posters, was responding to articles in the Miami Herald and Bloonbeig
News reporting that the corporation's Vice President of Legal Affairs
was not a lawyer, and that he and Krinskyjointly owned a Rolls Royce
and a $15 million mansion.60 Not surprisingly, these reports triggered
heated discussion on the message board, of which Doe 6's comments
were part and parcel.
The tone of Doe 6's speech was perhaps the biggest indicator that
he was not implying or asserting actual facts about plaintiff.6' As the
court noted, Doe 6 used a "sarcastic, derisive tone,"62 "crude, ungram-
matical language,"63 "vulgar and insulting" words,64 and his posts were
"rude and childish."65 Al1 of these were cues to the "reasonable reader"
that his "diatribe"66 against three corporate officers (including plaintiff)
as boobs, losers, and crooks was not a factual assertion of criminality;
instead, calling plaintiff a "crook" was merely 'Juvenile name-calling" 67
and an expression of contempt.68 In a similar vein, the court treated
56 Id. at 238.
57 Id. (observing that anonymity "opens the door to libel and other tortious conduct").
58 See id. at 249.
59 See Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 247.
60 Id. at 249 n.19.
61 See id. at 248-50.
62 Id. at 248.
6 Id.
64 Id. at 249.
65 Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 250.
66 Id. at 249.
67 Id,
6 Id.
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Doe 6's statement about plaintiffs "fake medical degree" as non-
factual.69 This accusation was instead "only the latest entry in a pro-
tracted online debate about whether plaintiff's medical degree from
Spartan Health Sciences University in the West Indies justified her use
of the 'M.D.' tide in company documents." 70 In the context of the dis-
cussion thread from which it arose, the comment was an attempt to
"ridicule" plaintiff, as were the "satirical" references to her poor femi-
nine hygiene. 71
The end result was that the court found Doe 6's speech, reprehen-
sible as it was, constitutionally protected. 72 Thus, the court refused to
allow breach of Doe 6's anonymity.73 Where a court less well versed in
Internet culture might have seen invective unworthy of protection, 74
the Kiinsky court appreciated both the value of financial message
boards as a forum for ordinary John Does to discuss corporate affairs
and the distinctive nature of discourse on those boards. 75
fI. LESSONS GOING FORWARD
The cases above illustrate two trends in John Doe cases from the
last decade. Courts have both (1) crafted new legal doctrines to protect
anonymous speech, and (2) adapted existing First Amendment protec-
tions for hyperbole, satire, and other "non-factual" speech to protect
the distinctive discourse of Internet message boards. These develop-
ments have garnered plenty of scholarly attention, so I shall content
myself with three loosely connected observations.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 249.
72 Id. at 250.
73 Id.
74 In one recent case, a federal district court refused to accept a Doe's argument that
his posts to an Internet website were not defamatory because they appeared on a message
board 'well-known as a place for inane discussion and meaningless derogatory postings."
Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256 n.7 (D. Conn. 2008) [hereinafter AutoAdmit].
The court reasoned that people who searched for the plaintiffs name on the Internet
might find the allegedly defamatory postings about her without knowing "the site's alleged
reputation." Id. Thus, the judge concluded that plaintiff had made out a prima facie defa-
mation case based on the statements themselves, and ordered disclosure of the Doe de-
fendant's name. Id. For further discussion of the AutoAdmit case, see infra notes 80-106
and accompanying text.
75 See Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 234-50.
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A. A Uniform Standard Is Needed (Eventually)
The development of appropriate standards to govern the John
Doe cases has been and continues to be a piecemeal process, develop-
ing case-by-case and court-by-court. Even now, the scope of protection
for John Doe's anonymity may depend on where a plaintiff chooses to
sue (and can establish jurisdiction) and where the defendant's ISP, or
the website on which he posted, is located. While courts continue to
grope toward a consensus, the First Amendment right to speak anony-
mously online is compromised.
Even so, there is a positive aspect to piecemeal development of
legal rules in this area. When the law is asked to solve a problem cre-
ated by new technology, it is hard for the law to "get it right" unless de-
cisionmakers understand not just the technology; but the social and
cultural uses of the technology as well. The Doe cases illustrate the evo-
lutionary process by which judges have come to understand how differ-
ent Internet fora, and particularly message boards, work and what types
of conversations take place there. In the meantime, the courts have
served as "laboratories of experimentation," working out the kinks in
the various procedural standards. This is pure speculation, of course,
but up until this point, this process was probably preferable to having
federal policymakers jump in with a one-size-fits-all solution to the John
Doe problem before the social and technological implications were
clear. Now, however, there is no reason to leave the scope of a constitu-
tional right to be determined by lower courts. Instead, it is time for the
U.S. Supreme Court to provide definitive guidance as to the proper
balance between anonymous speech and the protection for reputation.
B. The David vs. Goliath Paradign May Be Shifting
The need for Supreme Court intervention is particularly urgent
because there are signs that the Goliath versus David paradigm may be
shifting, with uncertain implications for future legal developments.
Paradigm cases are important. One of the reasons courts have been
willing to adopt balancing tests that tilt in favor of anonymous speech is
because many of the early John Doe cases involved relatively powerful
Goliaths trying to silence puny Davids who had deigned to criticize
them on Internet message boards. Thanks to the hard work of cyber
civil liberties advocates, courts came to appreciate that John Doe cases
could involve cyberslapps just as easily as cybersmears, and they cali-
brated the legal doctrines accordingly. But what if judges come to be-
lieve harmful anonymous speech greatly outnumbers valuable anony-
mous speech? How charitable would judges have been in adopting
20091 1385
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these doctrines if the paradigm anonymous speech cases were "cyber-
bullying" cases against private figures?
The recent criminal case against Missouri mom Lori Drew cast the
public spotlight on the harm that anonymous speakers can cause, and
even prompted the development of a new legal theory to address that
harm. The 49-year-old Drew opened a MySpace account as "Josh Evans,"
a teenage boy, in order to start a correspondence with her 13-year-old
daughter's former friend, Megan Meier.76 After winning Meier's trust,
'Josh" cruelly "dumped" her by email, telling her: 'The world would be
a better place without you." 7 7 Meier emailed back: "You're the kind of
boy a girl would kill herself over," and then hanged herself.78 The story
prompted so much outrage that a federal prosecutor had to concoct a
way to prosecute Drew. 79 Essentially, the jury convicted Drew of "de-
frauding" MySpace by misrepresenting her identity and motives for
opening an account. Although the Drew case is not a John Doe case, it
certainly is a cautionary tale about the dangers of anonymous speech.
Another potentially paradigm-shifting John Doe case is Doe I v. In-
dividuals, the so-called AutoAdmit case.80 AutoAdmit.com ("AutoAdmit")
is a message board for law students and prospective law students to
share information about admissions, hiring possibilities, and other top-
ics of interest.81 Unfortunately, AutoAdmit also attracts a number of
posters who use the site to make the most racist, sexist, and generally
reprehensible posts imaginable.82 Posters using screen names such as
AK47, stanfordtroll, and Dirty Nigger targeted two Yale law students in
particular with their venom.8 3 For example, they posted that one of the
students, Brittan Heller, had bribed her way into Yale and had a sexual
affair with a Yale administrator.84 They also posted that the other stu-
76Jennifer Steinhauer, Verdict in MySpace Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A25.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See id. Ajury convicted Drew of three misdemeanors for accessing a computer with-
out authorization under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Id.
80 (Autoadmit) 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008). The plaintiffs brought copyright
claims as well as claims for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 252. The trial judge later denied one defendant's motion to quash plaintiffs'
subpoena duces tecum to the defendant's Internet service provider. Id. at 249. For more on
the factual background of the case, see David Margolick, Slimed Online, PORTFOLIO, Mar.
2009, at 80, available at http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/
2009/02/11/Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-Bullying.
81 AutoAdmit, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
82 See First Amended Complaint, Autoadmit, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (No. 307CV00909
CFD), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 7536.
- Id. 11 30, 48-49.
- Id. 1 27, 31.
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dent, Heide Iravani, had gonorrhea and was addicted to heroin. 85 Even
more alarming were posts in which one poster threatened to force him-
self on Heller and "sodomize her. Repeatedly." 6 One poster made clear
that he was a fellow Yale law student who had ogled Iravani in the
gym. 87 Another posted a picture of her on a linked website's "beauty
contest," and another wrote that "[w] omen named ... Heide should be
raped."88 To add injury to insult, all of these atrocious comments were
visible to anyone who chose to Google the names of Heller or Iravani.8 9
Many private-figure victims would lack the resources to bring a
John Doe suit against their tormentors, particularly where the tormen-
tors would be unlikely to have deep pockets to satisf4, claims.90 However,
the AutoAdmit situation garnered so much publicity that the two
women were able to get pro bono counsel to go after almost fortyJohn
Does who had posted on the website. 91 They brought defamation, copy-
right infringement, and other claims, and then successfully subpoenaed
the identities of several of the John Does. 92 Although the claims were
resolved out of court in a confidential settlement, it was clear from the
outset that the plaintiffs had already won a victory of sorts.93 Some of
the unmasked defendants apologized or tried to settle;94 some went to
court;95 and others paid social and professional penalties for their mis-
behavior.96 The board's moderator finally agreed to remove some of
- Id. 1 50, 54.
- Id. 21.
87 See id. 736.
88 First Amended Complaint, supra note 82, 17 39, 49.
- Id. 19.
0 Some of the defendants appear to have had coverage for libel judgments via a
homeowner's policy. See Margolick, supra note 80, at 118.
91 See AutoAdmit, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
92 Id. at 252, 257.
93 Edmund H. Mahony, Ex-Yale Students Settle Internet Defamation Lawsuit, HARTFORD COU-
RANT, Oct. 22, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-
autoadmitl022.artoct22,0,3272457.story.
94 See Margolick, supra note 80, at 86-87.
9 See, e.g., AutoAdmit, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
9 See Margolick, supra note 80, at 86-87. One of the defendants, law student Anthony
Ciolli, was dismissed from the lawsuit, apparently based on his position as a director or
administrator of the AutoAdmit website rather than on his own statements about plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, his prospective employer rescinded his offer of employment upon learning
of his involvement in the affair, presumably faulting his poor judgment in refusing to cen-
sor the offending posts. Amir Efrati, Law Firm Rescinds Offer to Ex-AutoAdmit Executive, Wall
StreetJournal Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/03/law-frm-rescinds-offer-to-
ex-autoadmit-director/ (May 3, 2007, 11:02 EST). The plaintiffs were unable to obtain
some identities because the posters sent their messages from public computers. See Margol-
ick, supra note 80, at 87.
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the offensive posts about the women, and the suit seems to have had a
modest civilizing influence on the AutoAdmit message board by re-
minding posters that speech can indeed have consequences. 97 More-
over, both plaintiffs have obtained prestigious legal employment, de-
spite the alleged harm to their reputations. 98
It remains to be seen whether AutoAdmit or other cases highlight-
ing the dark side of anonymous speech will influence future legislation
or case law.99 One might argue that the case demonstrates the efficacy
of the "prima facie" balancing test developed in cases like Independent
Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie and Dendrite International Inc. v. Doe No. 3. The
federal district judge in the AutoAdmit case denied defendant AK47's
motion to quash a subpoena only after concluding that Heller and Ira-
vani had made out a prima facie case of defamation against him.100
Unlike the court in Krinsky v. Doe 6, the judge refused to accept the ar-
gument that the allegedly defamatory posts were non-factual because
they appeared on a message board "well-known as a place for inane dis-
cussion and meaningless derogatory postings."10 1 The court reasoned
that people who searched for the plaintiffs name on the Internet
might access the allegedly defamatory postings about her without
knowing "the site's alleged reputation."10 2 Thus, the prima face case was
essentially made by the statements themselves, regardless of the mes-
sage board context. 103
It is worth pointing out that the district judge reasonably could
have concluded that the statements were actionable even within the
message board context. Although the message board was filled with
inane comments, not every comment was meaningless; otherwise, there
would be no First Amendmentjustification for protecting these forums.
Moreover, some of the posters clearly sought to add credibility to their
postings by claiming to know Heller and Iravani in the off-line world.10 4
Many of the posts did include juvenile name-calling ("stupid bitch")
97 See Margolick, supra note 80, at 118.
98 See id. at 86, 118.
99 As I was writing this section, anonymous speakers in Iran were using their online re-
sources to overcome government censorship and carry their protests against its totalitarian
practices to the world. See Nazila Fathi, Protesters Defy Iranian Efforts to Cloak Unrest, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2009, at Al.
100 561 F. Supp. 2d at 256-57.
101 Id. at 256 n.7.
102 Id.
103 See id.
104 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 82, 36.
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and sexist references to the women's appearances, 105 but some of the
repeated allegations about the sexual behavior of the women arguably
crossed the line from name-calling into assertions of fact. Even more
disturbing, a few of the posts arguably fell into the unprotected speech
category of "true threats," coupling as they did imprecations of sexual
violence, posting of pictures of plaintiffs, and the implication that some
posters had access to the women "off-line."10 6 Finally, it bears emphasiz-
ing that the plaintiffs apparently became targets of abuse not because
they ran a business, held public office, or sought to influence public
affairs, but simply because of gender, intelligence, and appearance. Al-
though their suit was clearly brought to silence their critics, there was
relatively little danger of silencing discussion on matters of public con-
cern.
C. Libel Law Is Only a Partial Remedy for the Real Harms of Cybersmears
The AutoAdmit case highlights one of the glaring limitations of li-
bel law: its lack of effective remedies for the real harms suffered by vic-
tims of cybersmears. 10 7 Like many libel plaintiffs, the AutoAdmit plain-
tiffs wanted their dignity restored. They did not want every person who
Googled their names to discover they had been the targets of young
men's verbal abuse and sexual objectification. They wanted the ability
to manage their own self-representations in the online environment.
They doubtless wanted to exact vengeance on their tormentors, and,
more simply, they wanted the offending posts taken down.
If libel law provides any of these remedies, it is largely by accident
rather than design. Libel law gives successful plaintiffs compensatory
and occasionally punitive damages, 0 8 remedies that are virtually mean-
105 See id. 1 18, 21, 42.
106 See id. 1125, 36, 39.
107 As I have argued previously, the application of the actual malice standard in the
Doe cases, or indeed in any cases involving non-media defendants, is also exceedingly
problematic. Lidsky, supra note 1, at 915-19.
108 The obstacles to recovery are high. The common law of defamation is "filled with
technicalities and traps for the unwary." David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair
Game and Fair Comment 11, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1282, 1285 (1942). For more on these techni-
calities, see Lidsky; supra note 1, at 872-74. The constitutional obstacles to plaintiffs' libel
actions vary depending on the identity of the plaintiff, the identity of the defendant, and
the type of speech at issue. See Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty
Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. LJ. 1519, 1525-45
(1987) (charting the constitutional requirements for different types of plaintiffs, defen-
dants, and speech); see also Lidsky, supra note 1, at 874-75. In addition to common law and
constitutional obstacles to recovery, some states have codified all or parts of their libel law,
and state constitutional provisions may impose additional obstacles.
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ingless when the defendant has no money to satisfy a judgment. Cer-
tainly, the act of suing brings some degree of vindication, acting as a
public declaration of the falsity of defendants' statements. 10 9 Moreover,
successfully unmasking a defendant may go a long way toward silencing
not just that defendant but also others like him. Being unmasked, or
even the fear of being unmasked, may prompt some defendants to ex-
press contrition and remorse. However, these remedies come from the
strategic use of litigation rather than from libel law itself, and not even
the indirect effect of libel law provides plaintiffs with the remedy they
may desire most, namely, getting offending posts removed from the
Internet.
The absence of a "take down" remedy in defamation law partly ex-
plains the rise of reputation management companies like Reputation-
Defender and Reputation Hawk. These companies provide several ser-
vices. First, they monitor what is being said about their clients online.
Second, the), provide "positive content" to boost a client's online repu-
tation and shift negative content "down" in search rankings. Third, they
attempt to "scrub" a client's reputation by getting damaging content
removed. Hiring a reputation management company sometimes pro-
vides an attractive alternative to suing for libel because suing often
brings more attention to the libelous statements. A reputation man-
agement strategy can also be an adjunct to a defamation suit. For ex-
ample, in the AutoAdmit case, ReputationDefender set up a website and
petition drive to pressure AutoAdmit's operator to moderate the site
and remove abusive postings.110 ReputationDefender also enlisted law
school deans, leading then-Dean Elena Kagan to urge Harvard Law
School students to boycott AutoAdmit.11 The immediate result was a
backlash against plaintiffs on the message board, but the longer-term
result may have been to move the negative postings about them down
in Google's search engine ranking. 112
CONCLUSION
For those worried about the harms caused by cybersmears, the
current state of the law is dispiriting. An angry lover, a disgruntled em-
ployee, or simply a mischievous character assassin can start a campaign
109 See RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS 162 (1987) (conclud-
ing that some plaintiffs feel that they win simply by suing).
110 Margolick, supra note 80, at 86.
111 Id.
112 See id.
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of lies, and often the victim will have little meaningful recourse. For
those worried about harms caused by cyberslapps, there are also trou-
bling signs. Courts have developed new legal standards, but the scope
of protection of this First Amendment right varies greatly by jurisdic-
tion. Even where there are protective legal standards in place, they pro-
vide no real protection to speakers without the resources to hire coun-
sel. Though disheartening, the current state of the law may simply be a
testament to the difficulty of balancing speech and reputation in the
Internet age.
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